The dramatic upsurge of overseas migration from many Asian countries to the Middle East during the late 1970s and early 1980s focused attention of policymakers and researchers on its impact, in particular on the domestic labor market, as well as more generally on the overall development process in the labor sending countries. An important issue which was examined in some detail, including by the ILO, was how this phenomenon, especially the large inflows of remittances by overseas workers, could be analyzed within a macroeconomic perspective so that its impact on the economy and the society as a whole could be evaluated. The aim was to develop appro-priate policies and strategies which could help, maximize its development benefits for both the migrant and the sending country and minimize to the extent possible its adverse effects on the economy.
Almost two decades later after these dramatic movements first surfaced, attention seems to have shifted,motivated perhaps more by the concerns of the labor-receiving countries, to how an acceleration of the process of development in the labor-sending countries could slow down the magnitude of outflow of migrants from these countries. Couched in terms of" emigration pressures," "turning points" and "migration transition," these analytical Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 5, Nos. 2-3, 1996 339 340 ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL studies focus on factors which would ultimately slow down the pace of outmigration by accelerating the process of economic development;.and job creation in the labor-sending countries so as to reduce the urge or pressure of the domestic labor force to find jobs outside the national boundaries. Again, analysts and researchers (including the ILO) have been recently involved in developing a framework and studying specific country experiences, including in the Asian region, to be able to identify macroeconomic and sectoral policies which would reduce the "emigration pressures" from the laborsending countries.
Besides the well known concern of labor-receiving countries, especially the more developed, about the inflow of migrant workers, there has been also a discernible change in the attitudes of many governments of the Asian laborsending countries, from one of actively and in some cases aggressively encouraging overseas migration to one of reducing the economies dependence on overseas migration. In some cases, this is proposed to be done through outright banning or targeting significant reduction in the number of those leaving the country for employment overseas. This change has been brought about by increasing evidence and growing public feeling in the laborsending countries that migrants, especially females, suffer from considerable exploitation in the labor-receiving countries, and that authorities in these countries have been negligent, or at least very reluctant, to provide adequate protection to their migrant population.
Although an important factor, this has not been the only reason for this change in attitude. There is also at the same time an increasing feeling that the migration phenomenon has not in any real way contributed to the overall development effort in the labor-sending countries. In some cases, its impact may in fact have been more negative than positive, delaying or providing the cushion to procrastinate importantly needed economic and structural reforms in the country.
This important change in public thinking and policy perspective on migration is best illustrated by the example of the Philippines, where especially after the recent hanging in March 1995 of a maid in Singapore, there has been a period of" intense soul searching by the Philippine nation on its status as one of the leading exporters of labor in the world" (Saith, 1996, p.1) . In Indonesia too, recent government pronouncements have also indicated a marked preference for shifting overseas migration to the export of skilled labor and away from the large number of female domestic helpers, although the Government would still wish to target a manifold increase in its total remittance flows.
This paper is based primarily on the results of two recent studies conducted by the ILO /SEAPAT (with UNDP financial support) on the Philippines (Saith, 1996) and Indonesia (Nayyar, 1996) , which examine the issue of emigration pressures and structural change in these countries, as well as a more general study to develop a methodological fr<llll.eworkof analysis for the country studies (Connell, 1996) . Two other countries, namely Vietnam and China, are also being covered under this project by the ILO's East Asia Multidisciplinary Team (ILO/EASMAT),based in Bangkok. It is expected that these four country reports would identify economic policy issues which have direct or indirect implications for emigration pressures in the short and long term. The effort at this stage is essentially exploratory and is meant to raise issues rather than draw firm conclusions. Each country report, it is hoped, would be able to identify and describe economic policies where a prima facie case can be made of an impact on emigration pressures, and suggest how these might be taken into account by national authorities in designing development strategies.
The primary focus of this paper is to examine two central issues which have dominated the development debate on migration. The first is on the nexus between development and migration or more pertinently in what way, if any, and under what conditions can migration favorably contribute to the process of economic development. The second is the extent to which higher rates of economic growth and more employment-intensive development can impact upon reducing emigration pressures in a predominantly labor surplus economy.
Clearly, these are complex and wide issues and defy easy answers. But it is hoped that an analysis of the development and migration experience of the two countries covered in this paper could assist us in formulating our views on these difficult questions. The experience of these two countries may be especially pertinent as one of the two countries being examined,namely the Philippines, is commonly referred to as the second largest global exporter of labor, while at the same time, its development experience over the last two decades has been, atleastuntil very recently, extremely disappointing. On the other hand, Indonesia is now cited as one of the "East Asian Miracle" countries with an extremely impressive economic performance over the last two and half decades, and yet overseas migration, though not insignificant, has been somewhat marginal in its overall impact on economic development in the country.
The central message of this paper still remains essentially unchanged from the position taken by the author in his earlier analysis (Amjad,1989) ,that migration can have an overall favorably impact on the development process through the adoption of conducive overall macroeconomic and sectoral policies and selective policy interventions by the Governments in the laborsending countries. Not surprisingly, it is also the same policy package which would move the labor-sending country towards the so called "tumingpoint" in the migration process by accelerating the process of development and productive job creation in the domestic economy.
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The paper does not examine in any great detail the demand prospects for migrant labor in the labor-receiving countries. Nor doesitexC\Illine the impact of inflow of migrant labor on the host country either in terms of economic benefits or social costs. However, the underlying argument is, and this is only briefly elaborated upon in different parts of the paper, that there is still considerable scope for putting in place an agreed set of rules and policies which could lead to economic and social benefits for both the labor-sending and labor-receiving countries, and at the same time, ensure better protection for the more vulnerable migrants. Ata time when xenophobic sentiments seem to be fast gaining ground in many industrialized and semi-industrialized economies, and also in labor-receiving developing countries, this view may been seen as somewhat" optimistic." However, the age-old phenomenon of emigration has been threatened before, and in an increasingly globalized world the chances that it will drastically slow down or abruptly come to an end are at the very least remote. It is, however, especially important at the present time to openly debate the merits and demerits of migration and examine policies which will make it mutually beneficial for both laborsending and labor-receiving countries and help resolve the highly emotive and charged debate on this issue.
Economic Experience of the Philippines and Indonesia
It may be best to recount, albeit briefly, the main features of economic development that the Philippines and Indonesia have experienced during the last thirty years.
In the Philippines, average living standards steadily declined over the last three"decades relative to its neighbors in East and South-East Asia. According to Khan (1996) , in 1960, the Philippines had a real per capita GOP (purchasing power parity $ GOP) which was higher than that of Indonesia, Thailand, Republic of Korea, Taiwan/Province of China (hereafter referred to as Taiwan/China) and the People's Republic of China. By the early 1990s, it had fallen below all these countries. As compared to the Republic of Korea, its per capita real GOP was 28 percent higher in 1960, but by the early 1990s, it had become 71 percent lower. It is important to note that even in absolute terms per capita GOP in the Philippines was lower in 1991 as compared to 1977.
A breakdown of Philippines growth performance shows thatitperformed moderately well during the 1960s and 1970s, but dismally during the 1980s and the early 1990s. During the earlier period, it achieved a 6 percent annual rate of growth in GOP (3 percent in per capita GOP),which though much lower than most of its East Asian neighbors was significantly higher than those of the less developed countries taken as a whole. However, even during this period, its success in reducing the incidence of poverty was very limited in absolute terms and distinctly poor in comparison with what was achieved by its neighbors. An important factor was the inadequate expansion of productive and remunerative employment which still remains as the most effective means of reducing poverty.
During the subsequent period 1980-1993, per capita GDP fell at an average annual rate of 0.5 percent per year. The most dramatic decline was during 1983-1985 when growth fell by 15 percent. Despite some decline in the level of poverty from 49.3 percent during 1983 -1985 to 41.3 percent in 1992 -1994 (Balisacan, 1996 , the absolute level of poverty remains extremely high, at a time when many ofits neighbors in East and Southeast Asia have achieved remarkable success in reducing poverty. The country has not improved its performance in terms of most human development indicators. While significant improvements were registered in measures of health and education through the 1960s and 1970s, progress has drastically slowed down in the subsequent period. Infant mortality declined very little, especially from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s from 66 per 1,000 live births in 1970 to 48 in 1992. More thana quarter of the population was functionally illiterate, although the 1990 census reported a 94 percent literacy rate (see World Bank, 1995a). Unfortunately, political developments and resulting uncertainty, natural disasters, the debt crisis and subsequent forced stabilization, all contributed to this dramatic decline.
Over the last two years, political stability and the institution of economic reforms have led to a revival of economic growth. During 1994, economic growth was 5.5 percent, in 1995 nearer 6 percent and is estimated to reach 7 percent in 1996. However, the growth momentum still remains fragile and its employment impact is still to be fully realized.
In sharp contrast to the Philippines, the development experience of Indonesia during the last twenty-five years is extremely impressive, and in some key respects comes close to the successful experiences of East Asian countries. During this period, per capita income increased at a rate of 4.5 percent per annum while the gro,wthin GDPwas almost 7 percent per annum. As Nayyar (1996) points out, there were also major improvements in indicators of human development as life expectancy rose from 45.7 years in 1970 to 61.5 years in 1990, infant mortality fell from 145 per thousand in 1970 to 68 per thousand in 1990 and adult literacy rates increased from 54 percent in 1970 to 82 percent in 1990. Between 1960 and 1990 , the crude birth rate declined from 44 per thousand to 28 per thousand, the crude death rate dropped from 23 per thousand to 9per thousand, and the under-five mortality rate fell from 225 per thousand to 97 per thousand.
The high rates of economic growth, especially the spectacular growth in labor-intensive manufactured exports (which increased from U5$8OO million ASIAN AND PACIFIC MIGRA nON JOURNAL in 1985 to almost US$7,OOO million in 1991), have been "employmentfriendly" and have led to an appreciable decline in poverty levels. __ ,The percentage of people living below the poverty line is estimated to have declined from 40 percent in 1976 to 17 percent in 1992. While the reduction in the incidence of poverty was about the same in rural and urban areas, there are,however,large regional variations which are closely linked to the level of development within a region.
It must, however, be emphasized that despite its impressive overall economic performance Indonesian has only recently graduated from a lowincome to a lower middle-income economy with a per capita income in 1993 of US$ 740 (World Bank, 1995b) and its real GOP per capita based on purchasing power parity was in 1992 about the same as for Pakistan at US$ 2,950 (UNDP, 1995). While there have been fluctuations in both agricultural and industrial real wages, the general tendency has .been of a stagnant or slightly downward trend during the 1980s. As a result of very low wages, devaluation and productivity increases, unit labor costs (in US$ terms) fell faster in Indonesia than most of its Asian competitors and this has been a critical factor in putting Indonesia at an increasing advantage in international markets for labor-intensively produced goods (Godfrey, 1993) . It is primarily the very low level of wages that resulted in the more recent industrial unrest in 1994, and has made the Government realize that some fundamental changes in economic policy are urgently needed as reflected in the Second 25-Year Long Term Oevelopment Program PJP II (1994-2019).
The Economic Impact of International Migration in the Philippines and Indonesia
It is not the purpose of this paper to examine the factors and economic policies which were responsible for the relative economic performance of these two countriesoverthelasttwoandahalfdecades. There is a large body of literature on the subject and a growing (neo-liberal) consensus on economic policies and reform measures needed to push countries to a more efficient and sustainable growth path which could also have a favorable impact on poverty alleviation and income distribution.
In terms of the economic impact of international migration on economic development, it is much easier to deal first with Indonesia where the dimensions of the labor flows and the financial flows associated with it were small, almost negligible, in the wider context of the national economy. Nayyar (1996) identifies three discernible phases in internationalmigration from Indonesia (see Table 1 ). Starting in 1969 to 1979 nearly half of the total emigration was to Europe, mostly to Holland, shaped by post-colonial ties. The second phase, from 1979 to 1989, saw the country enter the emigration 1969-1974 1974-1979 1979-1984 1984-1989 1989-1994 boom to the Middle East, mostly to Saudi Arabia, as almost three-fourths of total emigration was in that direction. The more recent 1989 to 1994 period has seen a striking increase in the relative importance of Southeast Asia, which accounted for one-third of total emigration, mainly to Malaysia and Singapore. However, the Middle East, essentially Saudi Arabia, still accounted for the major share of emigration during this period. In terms of numbers, emigration from Indonesia of recorded migrants increased from 5,624 during 1969-74 (REPELITA I) to 652,272 during 1989-94 (REPELITA V). In 1993, annual labor outflows were 166,244, of which Saudi Arabia was the major destination (61.2 percent), followed by Malaysia (20.1 percent), Singapore (7.1 percent) and Taiwan/China (3.1 percent). However, a significant number of workers leave Indonesia unofficially and according to one claim, more workers leave Indonesia unofficially than officially for temporary employment abroad (Martin, 1995) . The large concentrationof illegalIndonesian workers is in nearby Malaysia, where the men are employed on plantations and construction sites and the women are employed in factories and in domestic service. While official statistics report that there are 220,000 Indonesian migrants in Malaysia, a wide range of sources suggests that the number may be as high as 750,000. The skill composition of migrants, as shown by official sources, is dominated by workers in domestic services, agriculture and transportation (see Table 2 ). According to official sources during 1989-94, domestic services (almost exclusively females) accounted for 60.2 percent of the total migrant workers, followed by agriculture, (22.3 percent, mainly plantations), and transportation (13.8 percent). There are two striking attributes to international labor migration from Indonesia. The first, that the majority of migrants are women. During 1984-94, two-thirds of the migrants from Indonesia were women. Second, that there are almost no migrants with professional expertise. As regards the latter, it is important to mention that there were 57,100 expatriates, mostly in management, 1?rofessional and supervisory category working in Indonesia in 1995, a 38 percent increase over the previous year. They were being paid $200 million each month (The Jakarta Post, January 23; 1996) . This could indicate a shortage of professional expertise and could explain to some extent the insignificant number of migrants in this category from Indonesia.
In 1990, according to Nayyar (1996) , official labor outflows from Indonesia amounted to a minuscule 0.13 percent of the total workforce, but constituted a more significant 6 percent of the increment in the workforce. Although estimates of unemployment and underemployment are characterized by serious conceptual and statistical limitations, it is worth noting that in 1990, . j emign>tion fmmIndonesia was4 percent of the total unemploymentand 035 . . percent of the total underemployment in the economy. Since a significant amount of the emigration particularly to the Middle East was temporary, so that withdrawal of labor was followed by re-entry, the above estimates need to be reduced by the amount of return migration. According to Nayyar' s (1996) estimates based on official statistics, during the period 1989-1993 return migration inflows were about 45 percent of emigration outflows. Correcting for these estimates of return inflows and adding back an estimated equal number of illegal migrant workers, it is clear that the overall impact of emigration on the labor market was not that significant. Nonetheless, a reductionof6-10percent (as in more recent years outflowshaveincre ased)of the increment in the labor force to outside employment must not be completely underestimated.
In principle, remittance inflows attributable to internationallabormigration can alleviate the savings constraint and the foreign exchange constraint, thus enabling the economy to attain a higher rate of growth. However, as Nayyar (1996) shows, remittance inflows to Indonesia as reported in official statistics are small enough to be treated as negligible in the context of the national economy. According to the Bank of Indonesia estimates (which are somewhatlower for selected years as compared to the Ministry of Manpower estimates), remittances from Indonesian workers increased from $90 million in 1987-88 to $344 million in 1994-95 ($480 million according to the Ministry ofManpower,seeTable3).Intheearly1990s,remittanceswereequivalentto 348 ASIAN AND PAOFIC MIGRATION JOURNAL a mere one percent of exporteamings. They were also insignificant in relation to macro variables. In 1992 for example, remittances were the equivalent of 0.2· percentofGDP,0.4percentofprivateconsumerexpenditure,andO.8percent of gross domestic fixed capital formation. In contrast, the total wage bill of expatriate workers was close to $2.5 billion in 1995 (The Jakarta Post, January 23,1996) .
The official evidence on remittances is puzzling as the level of remittances per capita is only a fraction of what it is in other Asian labor-exporting countries. At the end of 1993-1994, according to official statistics there were about 625,000 Indonesian migrants working abroad. Evidence based on different sources suggests that there were at least an equal number of illegal migrants abroad. This would make for a total migrant population abroad of about 1.2 million which is comparable to the estimates for migrant population abroad of India and Pakistan where remittances are in the range of US$3 billion. It is reasonable to infer that remit-tance inflows to Indonesia are underestimated because they are unreported.
Based on his review of labor and remittance flows, Nayyar (1996) concludes that "the macroeconomic significance therefore, is qualitative rather than quantitative and the impact of international migration on the national economy is far less than in other Asian countries, say the Philippines or Pakistan. But it cannot be ignored" (Ibid, p. 26) .
Turning now to the Philippines, Saith (1996) , points out that Filipino migration has occurred in five waves, the last three of which have fed into each other. Thefirstwaverunsfrom1906to1934,almostentirelytoHawaiiwhich by 1934 had more than 120,000 Filipinos. But as of 1929, 41 percent of the Filipinos left Hawaii, either to return to the Philippines, or to move on to the harvest picker trails in the United States. The period 1934-65 could be regarded as the lull before the next tidal wave. The third phase began in 1965 with the lifting of the nationality based United States immigration quota system, from which Filipinos were able to take quick advantage. Most of these new migrants were highly skilled professionals. The period also witnessed the entry of Filipino seamen into the emigration stream. The fourth phase, starting in the early 1970s to the now oil-rich Gulf countries accelerated after 1976. The final and fifth wave which continues into the present, although much smaller than the Middle Eastern one, has seen a significant rise in the share of emigration to the rapidly growing Asian economies, mainly Japan, Taiwan/China, Hongkong, Singapore a ñ
Malaysia. This period has also seen a sharp rise in the number of seamen deployed overseas.
This brief historical review is important, for to be able to gauge the impact of migration on the national economy one needs to differentiate between the three different streams of emigration from the Philippines. The first are the permanent emigrants, the second the recorded (or documented, or official or legal) overseas contract workers (OCWs), and third the unrecorded (or undocumented, unofficial or illegal) flows outwards. The behavior of the first, in relation to the other two can be quite different, especially as regards the flow of remittances, and the use of remittances by the receiving households. As regards outflows of land based Filipino overseas contract workers (OCWs), these increased from 12,501 in 1975 to 565,226 in 1994 , while the total number including sea-based OCWs was 719,602 in 1994 (see Table 4 ). In the same year, the largest number of deployed land based OCWs was in Saudi Arabia (215,631), followed by Hongkong (62,161), Japan (54,879), Taiwan/ China (34,387) and the UAE (27, 713) . In 1994, about 48 percent of the total deployed OCWs were females but they accounted for almost 60 percent of the new hires. By occupation, service workers, production and related workers and seafarers accounted for the bulk of total OCWs over the past thirty years. Because of the building boom in the Middle East in the 1970s and early 1980s, the share of production and related workers rose from 3.4 percent in 1995 to 47.3 percent in 1980 and 38.6 percent in 1985. This figure slid to 23.5 percent in 1991. In 1993, the bulk, 88.7 percent of newly hired construction workers, were still bound for the Middle East. According to the White Paper on the overseas employment program published by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), it is important to note that, "The majority of new hires in 1994 were in the vulnerable occupations, with domestic help (26.34 percent)
